

Exhibit G

FILED

Shelley von Brincken n
14738 Wolf Rd
Grass Valley CA 95949

SEP -1 2010 *KJN*

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BY _____ DEPUTY CLERK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Shelley von Brincken

Case # 2:10-cv-02153-JAM-KJN

Plaintiff,

vs.

MORTGAGECLOSE.COM INC.

**AMENDED ORIGINAL
PETITION**

Defendant

Executive Trust Services dba ETS

Services, LLC

Defendant

GMAC Mortgage, LLC

Defendant

Date: 9-1-10

Notice to the court: The only amendment made by Plaintiff is the inclusion of another defendant. The trustee sale notice provided to Plaintiff only included Mortgageclose.com, inc and ETS services. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, GMAC Mortgage, LLC is now claiming that they are the moving party, though the trustee deed sale fails to name them.

Comes now Shelley von Brincken , hereinafter referred to as "Petitioner," and moves the court for relief as herein requested:

PARTIES

Petitioner is Shelley von Brincken , 14738 Wolf Rd Grass Valley CA 95949.

Currently Known Defendant(s) are/is: MORTGAGECLOSE.COM INC. , 1855

1 WEST KATELLA AVE, SUITE 200 ORANGE, CA 92867, Executive Trust
2 Services dba ETS Services, LLC LLC 2255 N. Ontario St, Ste 400, Burbank, CA
3 91504 , and GMAC Mortgage, LLC, 3451 Hammond Ave, P.O. Box 780
4 Waterloo, IA 50704 by and through its attorney

5 **STATEMENT OF CAUSE**

6 Petitioner, entered into a consumer contract for the refinance of a primary
7 residence located at 14738 Wolf Rd, Grass Valley CA 95949, hereinafter referred
8 to as the "property."

9 Defendants, acting in concert and collusion with others, induced Petitioner to enter
10 into a predatory loan agreement with Defendant.

12 Defendants committed numerous acts of fraud against Petitioner in furtherance of a
13 carefully crafted scheme intended to defraud Petitioner.

14 Defendants failed to make proper notices to Petitioner that would have given
15 Petitioner warning of the types of tactics used by Defendants to defraud Petitioner.

16 Defendants charged false fees to Petitioner at settlement.

18 Defendants used the above referenced false fees to compensate agents of Petitioner
19 in order to induce said agents to breach their fiduciary duty to Petitioner.

20 Defendant's attorney caused to be initiated collection procedures, knowing said
21 collection procedures in the instant action were frivolous as lender is estopped
22 from collection procedures, under authority of Uniform Commercial Code 3-501,
23 subsequent to the request by Petitioner for the production of the original
24 promissory note alleged to create a debt.

25 **IN BRIEF**

26 *(Non-factual Statement of Posture and Position)*

27 It is not the intent of Petitioner to indict the entire industry. It is just that
28 Plaintiff will be making a number of allegations that, outside the context of

1 the current condition of the real estate industry, may seem somewhat
2 outrageous and counter-intuitive.

3 When Petitioner accuses ordinary individuals of acting in concert and
4 collusion with an ongoing criminal conspiracy, it tends to trigger an
5 incredulous response as it is unreasonable to consider that all Agents, loan
6 agents, appraisers, and other ordinary people, just doing what they have been
7 trained to do, are out to swindle the poor unsuspecting borrower.

8 The facts Petitioner is prepared to prove are that Petitioner has been harmed
9 by fraud committed by people acting in concert and collusion, one with the
10 other. Petitioner has no reason to believe that the Agent, loan officer,
11 appraiser, and others were consciously aware that what they were doing was
12 part of an ongoing criminal conspiracy, only that it was, and they, at the very
13 least, kept themselves negligently uninformed of the wrongs they were
14 perpetrating. Petitioner maintains the real culprit is the system itself,
15 including the courts, for failure to strictly enforce the consumer protection
16 laws.

17 **CAREFULLY CRAFTED CRIMINAL CONNIVANCE**

18 *(General State of the Real Estate Industry)*

19 **THE BEST OF INTENTIONS**

20 Prior to the 1980's and 1990's ample government protections were in place to
21 protect consumers and the lending industry from precisely the disaster we
22 now experience. During President Clinton's administration, under the guise
23 of making housing available to the poor, primary protections were relaxed
24 which had the effect of releasing the unscrupulous on the unwary.

25 Prior to deregulation in the 1980's, lenders created loans for which they held
26 and assumed the risk. Consequently, Americans were engaged in safe and
27 stable home mortgages. With the protections removed, the unscrupulous

1 lenders swooped in and, instead of making loans available to the poor, used
2 the opportunity to convince the unsophisticated American public to do
3 something that had been traditionally taboo; home buyers were convinced to
4 speculate with their homes, their most important investment.

5 MORTGAGECLOSE.COM INC. , Ameriquest, Countrywide, and many
6 others swooped in and convinced Americans to sell their homes, get out of
7 their safe mortgage agreements, and speculate with the equity they had gained
8 by purchasing homes they could not afford. Lenders created loans intended
9 to fail as, under the newly crafted system, the Lender profited more from a
10 mortgage default than from a stable loan.

11 Companies cropped up who called themselves banks when, in fact, they were
12 only either subsidiaries of banks, or unaffiliated companies that were
13 operated for the purpose of creating and selling promissory notes. As will be
14 demonstrated, these companies then profited from the failure of the
15 underlying loans.

16 **HOW IT WORKS**

17 Briefly, how it works is this, the Lender would secure a large loan from a
18 large bank, convert that loan into 20 and 30 year mortgages and then sell the
19 promise to pay to an investor.

20 People would set up mortgage companies buy securing a large loan from one
21 of the major banks, then convert that loan into 20 and 30 year mortgages. In
22 order to accomplish this an Agent would contract with a seller to find a buyer,
23 bring both seller and buyer to a lender who would secure the title from the
24 seller using the borrowed bank funds for that purpose, and then trade the title
25 to the buyer in exchange for a promissory note.

1 The lender then creates a 20 or 30 year mortgage with money the lender must
2 repay within 6 months. As soon as the closing is consummated, the
3 promissory note is sold to an investor pool.

4 Using the instant case as an example, a 220,000.00 note at 5.9140% interest
5 over 30 years will produce \$180,455.33 The lender can then offer to the
6 investor the security instrument (promissory note) at say 50% of it's future
7 value. The investor will, over the life of the note, less approximately 3.00%
8 servicing fees, realize \$233,152.81 . The lender can then pay back the bank
9 and retain a handsome profit in the amount of \$27,574.64. The lender,
10 however, is not done with the deal.

11 The lender signed over the promissory note to the investor at the time of the
12 trade, but did not sign over the lien document (mortgage or deed of trust).

13 The State of Kansas Supreme Court addressed this issue and stated that such
14 a transaction was certainly legal. However, it created a fatal flaw as the
15 holder of the lien document, at time of sale of the security instrument,
16 received consideration in excess of the lien amount. Since the lien holder
17 received consideration, he could not be harmed. Therefore the lien became
18 an unenforceable document.

19 This begs the question: if keeping the lien would render it void, why would
20 the lender not simply transfer the lien with the promissory note? The reason
21 is because the lender will hold the lien for three years, file an Internal
22 Revenue Service Form 1099a, claim the full amount of the lien as abandoned
23 funds, and deduct the full amount from the lender's tax liability. The lender,
24 by this maneuver, gets consideration a second time. And still the lender is not
25 done profiting from the deal.

26 After sale of the promissory note, the lender remains as the servicer for the
27 investor. The lender will receive 3% of each payment the lender collects and
28 renders to the investor pool. However, if the payment is late, the lender is

1 allowed to assess an extra 5% and keep that amount. Also, if the loan
2 defaults, the lender stands to gain thousands for handling the foreclosure.
3 The lender stands to profit more from a note that is overly expensive, than
4 from a good stable loan. And where, you may ask, does all this profit come
5 from? It comes from the equity the borrower had built up in the home. And
6 still the lender is not finished profiting from the deal.

7 Another nail was driven in the American financial coffin when on the last day
8 Congress was in session in 2000 when restrictions that had been in place
9 since the economic collapse of 1907 were removed. Until 1907 investors
10 were allowed to bet on stocks without actually buying them. This unbridled
11 speculation led directly to an economic collapse. As a result the legislature
12 banned the practice, until the year 2000. In 2000 the unscrupulous lenders
13 got their way on the last day of the congressional session. Congress removed
14 the restriction banning derivatives and again allowed the practice, this time
15 taking only 8 years to crash the stock market. This practice allowed the
16 lender to profit further from the loan by betting on the failure of the security
17 instrument he had just sold to the unwary investor, thus furthering the
18 purpose of the lender to profit from both the borrower (consumer) and the
19 investor.

20 The failure of so many loans recently resulted in a seven hundred and fifty
21 billion dollar bailout at the expense of the taxpayer. The unsuspecting
22 consumer was lulled into accepting the pronouncements of the lenders,
23 appraisers, underwriters, and trustees as all were acting under the guise of
24 government regulation and, therefore, the borrower had reason to expect good
25 and fair dealings from all. Unfortunately, the regulations in place to protect
26 the consumer from just this kind of abuse were simply being ignored.

27 The loan origination fee from the HUD1 settlement statement is the finder's
28 fee paid for the referral of the client to the lender by a person acting as an

1 agent for the borrower. Hereinafter, the person or entity who receives any
2 portion of the yield spread premium, or a commission of any kind consequent
3 to securing the loan agreement through from the borrower will be referred to
4 as "Agent." The fee, authorized by the consumer protection law is restricted
5 to 1% of the principal of the note. It was intended that the Agent, when
6 seeking out a lender for the borrower, would seek the best deal for his client
7 rather than who would pay him the most. That was the intent, but not the
8 reality. The reality is that Agents never come away from the table with less
9 than 2% or 3% of the principal. This is accomplished by undisclosed fees to
10 the Agent in order to induce the Agent to breach his fiduciary duty to the
11 borrower and convince the borrower to accept a more expensive loan product
12 than the borrower qualifies for. This will generate more profits for the lender
13 and, consequently, for the Agent.

14 It is a common practice for lenders to coerce appraisers to give a higher
15 appraisal than is the fair market price. This allows the lender to increase the
16 cost of the loan product and give the impression that the borrower is justified
17 in making the purchase.

18 The lender then charges the borrower an underwriting fee in order to
19 convince the borrower that someone with knowledge has gone over the
20 conditions of the note and certified that they meet all legal criteria. The
21 trustee, at closing, participates actively in the deception of the borrower by
22 placing undue stress on the borrower to sign the large stack of paperwork
23 without reading it. The trustee is, after all, to be trusted and has been paid to
24 insure the transaction. This trust is systematically violated for the purpose of
25 taking unfair advantage of the borrower. The entire loan process is a
26 carefully crafted contrive connivance designed and intended to induce the
27 unsophisticated borrower into accepting a loan product that is beyond the
28

1 borrowers means to repay. With all this, it should be a surprise to no one that
2 this country is having a real estate crisis.

3 **PETITIONER WILL PROVE THE FOLLOWING**

4 Petitioner is prepared to prove, by a preponderance of evidence that:

- 5 • Lender has no legal standing to bring collection or foreclosure claims
6 against the property;
- 7 • Lender is not a real party in interest in any contract which can claim a
8 collateral interest in the property;
- 9 • even if Lender were to prove up a contract to which Lender had
10 standing to enforce against Petitioner, no valid lien exists which would
11 give Lender a claim against the property;
- 12 • even if Lender were to prove up a contract to which Lender had
13 standing to enforce against Petitioner, said contract was fraudulent in
14 its creation as endorsement was secured by acts of negligence, common
15 law fraud, fraud by non-disclosure, fraud in the inducement, fraud in
16 the execution, usury, and breaches of contractual and fiduciary
17 obligations by Mortgagee or "Trustee" on the Deed of Trust,
18 "Mortgage Agents," "Loan Originators," "Loan Seller," "Mortgage
19 Aggregator," "Trustee of Pooled Assets," "Trustee or officers of
20 Structured Investment Vehicle," "Investment Banker," "Trustee of
21 Special Purpose Vehicle/Issuer of Certificates of 'Asset-Backed
22 Certificates,'" "Seller of 'Asset-Backed' Certificates (shares or bonds),"
23 "Special Servicer" and Trustee, respectively, of certain mortgage loans
24 pooled together in a trust fund;

- 1 • Defendants have concocted a carefully crafted connivance wherein
2 Lender conspired with Agents, et al, to strip Petitioner of Petitioner's
3 equity in the property by inducing Plaintiff to enter into a predatory
4 loan inflated loan product;
- 5 • Lender received unjust enrichment in the amount of 5% of each
6 payment made late to Lender while Lender and Lender's assigns acted
7 as servicer of the note;
- 8 • Lender and Lender's assigns, who acted as servicer in place of Lender,
9 profited by handling the foreclosure process on a contract Lender
10 designed to have a high probability of default;
- 11 • Lender intended to defraud Investor by converting the promissory note
12 into a security instrument and selling same to Investor;
- 13 • Lender intended to defraud Investor and the taxpayers of the United
14 States by withholding the lien document from the sale of the
15 promissory note in order that Lender could then hold the lien for three
16 years, then prepare and file Internal Revenue Form 1099a and falsely
17 claim the full lien amount as abandoned funds and deduct same from
18 Lender's income tax obligation;
- 19 • Lender defrauded backers of derivatives by betting on the failure of the
20 promissory note the lender designed to default;
- 21 • participant Defendants, et al, in the securitization scheme described
22 herein have devised business plans to reap millions of dollars in profits
23 at the expense of Petitioner and others similarly situated.

PETITIONER SEEKS REMEDY

In addition to seeking compensatory, consequential and other damages, Petitioner seeks declaratory relief as to what (if any) party, entity or individual or group thereof is the owner of the promissory note executed at the time of the loan closing, and whether the Deed of Trust (Mortgage) secures any obligation of the Petitioner, and a Mandatory Injunction requiring re-conveyance of the subject property to the Petitioner or, in the alternative a Final Judgment granting Petitioner Quiet Title in the subject property.

PETITIONER HAS BEEN HARMED

Petitioner has suffered significant harm and detriment as a result of the actions of Defendants.

Such harm and detriment includes economic and non-economic damages, and injuries to Petitioner's mental and emotional health and strength, all to be shown according to proof at trial.

In addition, Petitioner will suffer grievous and irreparable further harm and detriment unless the equitable relief requested herein is granted.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM

DEFENDANTS LACK STANDING

No evidence of Contractual Obligation

Defendants claim a controversy based on a contractual violation by Petitioner but have failed to produce said contract. Even if Defendants produced evidence of the existence of said contract in the form of an allegedly accurate photocopy of said document, a copy is only hearsay evidence that a contract actually existed at one point in time. A copy, considering the present state of technology, could be easily altered. As Lender only created one original and that original was left in the custody of Lender, it was imperative that Lender protect said instrument.

In as much as the Lender is required to present the original on demand of Petitioner, there can be no presumption of regularity when the original is not so produced. In as much as Lender has refused Petitioner's request of the chain of custody of the security instrument in question by refusing to identify all current and past real parties in interest, there is no way to follow said chain of custody to insure, by verified testimony, that no alterations to the original provisions in the contract have been made. Therefore, the alleged copy of the original is only hearsay evidence that an original document at one time existed. Petitioner maintains that, absent production of admissible evidence of a contractual obligation on the part of Petitioner, Defendants are without standing to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.

No Proper Evidence of Agency

Defendants claim agency to represent the principal in a contractual agreement involving Petitioner, however, Defendants have failed to provide any evidence of said agency other than a pronouncement that agency has been assigned by some person, the true identity and capacity of whom has not been established. Defendants can hardly claim to be agents of a principal then refuse to identify said principal. All claims of agency are made from the mouth of the agent with no attempt to provide admissible evidence from the principal.

Absent proof of agency, Defendants lack standing to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.

Special Purpose Vehicle

Since the entity now claiming agency to represent the holder of the security instrument is not the original lender, Petitioner has reason to believe that the promissory note, upon consummation of the contract, was converted to a security

1 and sold into a special purpose vehicle and now resides in a Real Estate Mortgage
2 Investment Conduit (REMIC) as defined by the Internal Revenue Code and as
3 such, cannot be removed from the REMIC as such would be a prohibited
4 transaction. If the mortgage was part of a special purpose vehicle and was
5 removed on consideration of foreclosure, the real party in interest would
6 necessarily be the trustee of the special purpose vehicle. Nothing in the pleadings
7 of Defendants indicates the existence of a special purpose vehicle, and the lack of a
8 proper chain of custody documentation gives Petitioner cause to believe defendant
9 is not the proper agent of the real party in interest.

10 ***CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AND THEFT***

11
12 Defendants, by and through Defendant's Agents, conspired with other Defendants,
13 et al, toward a criminal conspiracy to defraud Petitioner. Said conspiracy but are
14 not limited to acts of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, common law fraud,
15 fraud by non-disclosure, and tortuous acts of conspiracy and theft, to include but
16 not limited to, the assessment of improper fees to Petitioner by Lender, which were
17 then used to fund the improper payment of commission fees to Agent in order to
18 induce Agent to violate Agent's fiduciary duty to Petitioner.

19 ***AGENT PRACTICED UP-SELLING***

20
21 By and through the above alleged conspiracy, Agent practiced up-selling to
22 Petitioner. In so doing, Agent violated the trust relationship actively cultivated by
23 Agent and supported by fact that Agent was licensed by the state. Agent further
24 defrauded Petitioner by failing to disclose Agent's conspiratorial relationship to
25 Lender, Agent violated Agent's fiduciary duty to Petitioner and the duty to
26 provide fair and honest services, through a series of carefully crafted connivances,
27 wherein Agent proactively made knowingly false and misleading statements of
28 alleged fact to Petitioner, and by giving partial disclosure of facts intended to

1 directly mislead Petitioner for the purpose of inducing Petitioner to make decisions
2 concerning the acceptance of a loan product offered by the Lender. Said loan
3 product was more expensive than Petitioner could legally afford. Agent acted with
4 full knowledge that Petitioner would have made a different decision had Agent
5 given complete disclosure.

6 **FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT**

7 Lender maliciously induced Petitioner to accept a loan product, Lender knew, or
8 should have known, Petitioner could not afford in order to unjustly enrich Lender.
9

10 **EXTRA PROFIT ON SALE OF PREDATORY LOAN PRODUCT**

11 Said more expensive loan product was calculated to produce a higher return when
12 sold as a security to an investor who was already waiting to purchase the loan as
13 soon as it could be consummated.

14 **Extra Commission for Late Payments**

15 Lender acted with deliberate malice in order to induce Petitioner to enter into a
16 loan agreement that Lender intended Petitioner would have difficulty paying. The
17 industry standard payment to the servicer for servicing a mortgage note is 3% of
18 the amount collected. However, if the borrower is late on payments, a 5% late fee
19 is added and this fee is retained by the servicer. Thereby, the Lender stands to
20 receive more than double the regular commission on collections if the borrower
21 pays late.
22

23 **Extra Income for Handling Foreclosure**

24 Lender acted with deliberate malice in order to induce petitioner to enter into a
25 loan agreement on which Lender intended petitioner to default. In case of default,
26 the Lender, acting as servicer, receives considerable funds for handling and
27 executing the foreclosure process.
28

1 **Credit Default Swap Gambling**

2 Lender, after deliberately creating a loan intended to default is now in a position to
3 bet on credit default swap, commonly referred to as a derivative as addressed more
4 fully below. Since Lender designed the loan to fail, betting on said failure is
5 essentially a sure thing.

6 **LENDER ATTEMPTING TO FRAUDULENTLY COLLECT ON VOID**
7 **LIEN**

8
9 Lender sold the security instrument after closing and received consideration in an
10 amount in excess of the lien held by Lender. Since Lender retained the lien
11 document upon the sale of the security instrument, Lender separated the lien from
12 said security instrument, creating a fatal and irreparable flaw.

13 When Lender received consideration while still holding the lien and said
14 consideration was in excess of the amount of the lien, Lender was in a position
15 such that he could not be harmed and could not gain standing to enforce the lien.
16 The lien was, thereby, rendered void.

17 Since the separation of the lien from the security instrument creates such a
18 considerable concern, said separation certainly begs a question: "Why would the
19 Lender retain the lien when selling the security instrument?"

20
21 When you follow the money the answer is clear. The Lender will hold the lien for
22 three years, then file an IRS Form 1099a and claim the full amount of the lien as
23 abandoned funds and deduct the full amount from Lender's tax liability, thereby,
24 receiving consideration a second time.

25
26 Later, in the expected eventuality of default by petitioner, Lender then claimed to
27 transfer the lien to the holder of the security, however, the lien once satisfied, does
28 not gain authority just because the holder, after receiving consideration, decides to
 transfer it to someone else.

1 **LENDER PROFIT BY CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP DERIVATIVES**

2 Lender further stood to profit by credit default swaps in the derivatives market, by
3 way of inside information that Lender had as a result of creating the faulty loans
4 sure to default. Lender was then free to invest on the bet that said loan would
5 default and stood to receive unjust enrichment a third time. This credit default
6 swap derivative market scheme is almost totally responsible for the stock market
7 disaster we now experience as it was responsible for the stock market crash in
8 1907.

9 **LENDER CHARGED FALSE FEES**

10 Lender charged fees to Petitioner that were in violation of the limitations imposed
11 by the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act as said fees were simply contrived
12 and not paid to a third party vendor.

13 Lender charged other fees that were a normal part of doing business and should
14 have been included in the finance charge.

15 Below is a listing of the fees charged at settlement. Neither at settlement, nor at
16 any other time did Lender or Trustee provide documentation to show that the fees
17 herein listed were valid, necessary, reasonable, and proper to charge Petitioner.

19 803	Appraisal	\$196.00
20 808	Underwriting Fee	\$1,095.00
21 901	Interest from 01/22/09 to 02/01/09	\$343.75
22 902	Mortgage Insurance Premium	\$838.00
23 1101	Settlement fee	\$705.00
24 1106	Notary fee	\$100.00
25 1108	Title Insurance	\$951.50
26 1109	Lenders Coverage	\$429.00
27 1110	Owner's Coverage	\$1,045.00
28 1111	Environmental Protection Lien	\$25.00
1112	Upkeep Assessment fee	\$25.00
1201	Recording Fee	\$59.00
1202	City/county tax/stamp	\$302.00

1 Debtor is unable to determine whether or not the above fees are valid in
2 accordance with the restrictions provided by the various consumer protection laws.
3 Therefore, please provide; a complete billing from each vendor who provided the
4 above listed services; the complete contact information for each vendor who
5 provided a billed service; clearly stipulate as to the specific service performed; a
6 showing that said service was necessary; a showing that the cost of said service is
7 reasonable; a showing of why said service is not a regular cost of doing business
8 that should rightly be included in the finance charge.

9 The above charges are hereby disputed and deemed unreasonable until such time
10 as said charges have been demonstrated to be reasonable, necessary, and in
11 accordance with the limitations and restrictions included in any and all laws, rules,
12 and regulations intended to protect the consumer.

13 In the event lender fails to properly document the above charges, borrower will
14 consider same as false charges. The effect of the above amounts that borrower
15 would pay over the life of the note will be an overpayment of \$80,272.12 This
16 amount will be reduced by the amount of items above when said items are fully
17 documented.

18 **RESPA PENALTY**

19 From a cursory examination of the records, with the few available, the apparent
20 RESPA violations are as follows: Good Faith Estimate not within limits, No HUD-
21 1 Booklet, Truth In Lending Statement not within limits compared to Note, Truth
22 in Lending Statement not timely presented, HUD-1 not presented at least one day
23 before closing, No Holder Rule Notice in Note, No 1st Payment Letter.

24 The closing documents included no signed and dated : Financial Privacy Act
25 Disclosure; Equal Credit Reporting Act Disclosure; notice of right to receive
26 appraisal report; servicing disclosure statement; borrower's Certification of
27 Authorization; notice of credit score; RESPA servicing disclosure letter; loan

1 discount fee disclosure; business insurance company arrangement disclosure;
2 notice of right to rescind.
3 The courts have held that the borrower does not have to show harm to claim a
4 violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, as the Act was intended to
5 insure strict compliance. And, in as much as the courts are directed to assess a
6 penalty of no less than two hundred dollars and no more than two thousand,
7 considering the large number enumerated here, it is reasonable to consider that the
8 court will assess the maximum amount for each violation.
9 Since the courts have held that the penalty for a violation of RESPA accrues at
10 consummation of the note, borrower has calculated that, the number of violations
11 found in a cursory examination of the note, if deducted from the principal, would
12 result in an overpayment on the part of the borrower, over the life of the note, of
13 \$156,511.44.
14 If the violation penalty amounts for each of the unsupported fees listed above are
15 included, the amount by which the borrower would be defrauded is \$168,523.68
16 Adding in RESPA penalties for all the unsupported settlement fees along with the
17 TILA/Note variance, it appears that lender intended to defraud borrower in the
18 amount of \$405,307.24

19 ***LENDER CONSPIRED WITH APPRAISER***

20 Lender, in furtherance of the above referenced conspiracy, conspired with
21 appraiser for the purpose of preparing an appraisal with a falsely stated price, in
22 violation of appraiser's fiduciary duty to Petitioner and appraiser's duty to provide
23 fair and honest services, for the purpose of inducing Petitioner to enter into a loan
24 product that was fraudulent toward the interests of Petitioner.

25

26

27

28

1 **LENDER CONSPIRED WITH TRUSTEE**

2 Lender conspired with the trust Agent at closing to create a condition of stress for
3 the specific purpose of inducing Petitioner to sign documents without allowing
4 time for Petitioner to read and fully understand what was being signed.

5 The above referenced closing procedure was a carefully crafted connivance,
6 designed and intended to induce Petitioner, through shame and trickery, in
7 violation of trustee's fiduciary duty to Petitioner and the duty to provide fair and
8 honest services, to sign documents that Petitioner did not have opportunity to read
9 and fully understand, thereby, denying Petitioner full disclosure as required by
10 various consumer protection statutes.

11 **DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING AND OTHER UNFAIR BUSINESS
12 PRACTICES**

14 In the manner in which Defendants have carried on their business enterprises, they
15 have engaged in a variety of unfair and unlawful business practices prohibited by
16 *15 USC Section 45 et seq.* (Deceptive Practices Act).

17 Such conduct comprises a pattern of business activity within the meaning of such
18 statutes, and has directly and proximately caused Petitioner to suffer economic and
19 non-economic harm and detriment in an amount to be shown according to proof at
20 trial of this matter.

21 **EQUITABLE TOLLING FOR TILA AND RESPA**

23 The Limitations Period for Petitioners' Damages Claims under TILA and RESPA
24 should be Equitably Tolled due to the DEFENDANTS' Misrepresentations and
25 Failure to Disclose.

26 Any claims for statutory and other money damages under the Truth in Lending Act
27 (*15 U.S.C. § 1601, et. seq.*) and under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
28 (*12 U.S.C. § 2601 et. seq.*) are subject to a one-year limitations period; however,

1 such claims are subject to the equitable tolling doctrine. The Ninth Circuit has
2 interpreted the TILA limitations period in § 1640(e) as subject to equitable tolling.
3 In *King v. California*, 784 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1986), the court held that given the
4 remedial purpose of TILA, the limitations period should run from the date of
5 consummation of the transaction, but that "the doctrine of equitable tolling may, in
6 appropriate circumstances, suspend the limitations period until the borrower
7 discovers or has reasonable opportunity to discover the fraud or nondisclosures that
8 form the basis of the TILA action." *King v. California*, 784 F.2d 910, 915 9th Cir.
9 1986).

10 Likewise, while the Ninth Circuit has not taken up the question whether 12 U.S.C.
11 § 2614, the anti-kickback provision of RESPA, is subject to equitable tolling, other
12 Courts have, and hold that such limitations period may be equitably tolled. The
13 Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that § 2614 imposes a strictly
14 jurisdictional limitation, *Hardin v. City Title & Escrow Co.*, 797 F.2d 1037, 1039-
15 40 (D.C. Cir. 1986), while the Seventh Circuit came to the opposite conclusion.
16 *Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Dearborn Title Corp.*, 118 F.3d 1157, 1164 (7th Cir.
17 1997). District courts have largely come down on the side of the Seventh Circuit in
18 holding that the one-year limitations period in § 2614 is subject to equitable
19 tolling. See, e.g., *Kerby v. Mortgage Funding Corp.*, 992 F.Supp. 787, 791-98
20 (D.Md. 1998); *Moll v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co.*, 700 F.Supp. 1284, 1286-89
21 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Importantly, the Ninth Circuit, as noted above, has interpreted the
22 TILA limitations period in 15 U.S.C. § 1640 as subject to equitable tolling; the
23 language of the two provisions is nearly identical. *King v. California*, 784 F.2d at
24 914. While not of precedential value, this Court has previously found both the
25 TILA and RESPA limitations periods to be subject to equitable tolling. *Blaylock v.*
26 *First American Title Ins. Co.*, 504 F.Supp.2d 1091, (W.D. Wash. 2007). 1106-07.
27
28

1 The Ninth Circuit has explained that the doctrine of equitable tolling "focuses on
2 excusable delay by the Petitioner," and inquires whether "a reasonable Petitioner
3 would ... have known of the existence of a possible claim within the limitations
4 period." *Johnson v. Henderson*, 314 F.3d 409, 414 (9th Cir.2002), *Santa Maria v.*
5 *Pacific Bell*, 202 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir.2000). Equitable tolling focuses on the
6 reasonableness of the Petitioner's delay and does not depend on any wrongful
7 conduct by the Defendants. *Santa Maria*. at 1178.

8 **BUSINESS PRACTICES CONCERNING DISREGARDING OF
9 UNDERWRITING STANDARDS**

10 Traditionally, Lenders required borrowers seeking mortgage loans to document
11 their income and assets by, for example, providing W-2 statements, tax returns,
12 bank statements, documents evidencing title, employment information, and other
13 information and documentation that could be analyzed and investigated for its
14 truthfulness, accuracy, and to determine the borrower's ability to repay a particular
15 loan over both the short and long term. Defendants deviated from and disregarded
16 these standards, particularly with regard to its riskier and more profitable loan
17 products.

18 **Low-Documentation/No-Documentation Loans.**

19 Driven by its desire for market share and a perceived need to maintain
20 competitiveness with the likes of Countrywide, Defendants began to introduce an
21 ever increasing variety of low and no documentation loan products, including the
22 HARMs and HELOCs described hereinabove, and began to deviate from and ease
23 its underwriting criteria, and then to grant liberal exceptions to the already eased
24 underwriting standards to the point of disregarding such standards. This quickened
25 the loan origination process, allowing for the generation of more and more loans
26 which could then be resold and/or securitized in the secondary market.

1 Defendants marketed no-documentation/low-documentation loan programs that
2 included HARMs and HELOCs, among others, in which loans were given based
3 on the borrower's "stated income" or "stated assets" (SISA) neither of which were
4 verified. Employment was verbally confirmed, if at all, but not further investigated,
5 and income, if it was even considered as a factor, was to be roughly consistent with
6 incomes in the types of jobs in which the borrower was employed. When
7 borrowers were requested to document their income, they were able to do so
8 through information that was less reliable than in a full-documentation loan.

9 For stated income loans, it became standard practice for loan processors, loan
10 officers and underwriters to rely on www.salary.com to see if a stated income was
11 reasonable. Such stated income loans, emphasizing loan origination from a
12 profitability standpoint at the expense of determining the ability of the borrower to
13 repay the loan from an underwriting standpoint, encouraged the overstating and/or
14 fabrication of income.

15 **Easing of Underwriting Standards**

16 In order to produce more loans that could be resold in the secondary mortgage
17 market, Defendants also relaxed, and often disregarded, traditional underwriting
18 standards used to separate acceptable from unacceptable risk. Examples of such
19 relaxed standards were reducing the base FICO score needed for a SISA loan.

20 Other underwriting standards that Defendants relaxed included qualifying interest
21 rates (the rate used to determine whether borrowers can afford the loan), loan to
22 value ratios (the amount of loan(s) compared to the appraised/sale price of the
23 property, whichever is lower), and debt-to-income ratios (the amount of monthly
24 income compared to monthly debt service payments and other monthly payment
25 obligations).

26 With respect to HARMs, Defendants underwrote loans without regard to the
27 borrower's long-term financial circumstances, approving the loan based on the

1 initial fixed rate without taking into account whether the borrower could afford the
2 substantially higher payment that would inevitably be required during the
3 remaining term of the loan.

4 With respect to HELOCs, Defendants underwrote and approved such loans based
5 only on the borrower's ability to afford the interest-only payment during the initial
6 draw period of the loan, rather than on the borrower's ability to afford the
7 subsequent, fully amortized principal and interest payments.

8 As Defendants pushed to expand market share, they eased other basic underwriting
9 standards. For example, higher loan-to-value (LTV) and combined loan-to-value
10 (CLTV) ratios were allowed. Likewise, higher debt-to-income (DTI) ratios were
11 allowed. At the same time that they eased underwriting standards the Defendants
12 also were encouraging consumers to go further into debt in order to supply the very
13 lucrative aftermarket of mortgage backed securities. The relaxed underwriting
14 standards created the aftermarket supply they needed. As a result, the Defendants
15 made it easy for the unwary consumer to take on more debt than he could afford by
16 encouraging unsound financial practices, all the while knowing defaults would
17 occur more and more frequently as the credit ratios of citizens reached the limit of
18 the new relaxed underwriting standards.

19 Defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, from
20 its own underwriting guidelines industry standards that it was accumulating and
21 selling/reselling risky loans that were likely to end up in default. However, as the
22 pressure mounted to increase market share and originate more loans, Defendants
23 began to grant "exceptions" even to its relaxed underwriting guidelines. Such was
24 the environment that loan officers and underwriters were, from time to time, placed
25 in the position of having to justify why they did not approve a loan that failed to
26 meet underwriting criteria.
27

28 **Risk Layering**

1 Defendants compromised its underwriting even further by risk layering, i.e.
2 combining high risk loans with one or more relaxed underwriting standards.
3 Defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that
4 layered risk would increase the likelihood of default. Among the risk layering
5 Defendants engaged in were approving HARM loans with little to no down
6 payment, little to no documentation, and high DTI/LTV/CLTV ratios. Despite such
7 knowledge, Defendants combined these very risk factors in the loans it promoted
8 to borrowers.
9
10 Loan officers and mortgage Agents aided and abetted this scheme by working
11 closely with other mortgage Lenders/mortgage bankers to increase loan
12 originations, knowing or having reason to believe that Defendants and other
13 mortgage Lenders/mortgage bankers with whom they did business ignored basic
14 established underwriting standards and acted to mislead the borrower, all to the
15 detriment of the borrower and the consumer of loan products..
16 Petitioner is informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendants, and
17 each of them, engaged and/or actively participated in, authorized, ratified, or had
18 knowledge of, all of the business practices described above in paragraphs 30-42 of
19 this Complaint

20 **UNJUST ENRICHMENT**

21 Petitioner is informed and believes that each and all of the Defendants received a
22 benefit at Petitioner's expense, including but not limited to the following: To the
23 Agent, commissions, yield spread premiums, spurious fees and charges, and other
24 "back end" payments in amounts to be proved at trial; To the originating Lender,
25 commissions, incentive bonuses, resale premiums, surcharges and other "back end"
26 payments in amounts to be proved at trial; To the investors, resale premiums, and
27 high rates of return; To the servicers including EMS, servicing fees, percentages of
28

1 payment proceeds, charges, and other "back end" payments in amounts to be
2 proved at trial; To all participants, the expectation of future revenues from charges,
3 penalties and fees paid by Petitioner when the unaffordable LOAN was foreclosed
4 or refinanced.

5 By their misrepresentations, omissions and other wrongful acts alleged heretofore,
6 Defendants, and each of them, were unjustly enriched at the expense of Petitioner,
7 and Petitioner was unjustly deprived, and is entitled to restitution in the amount of
8 \$405,307.24

9 ***CLAIM TO QUIET TITLE.***

10 Petitioner properly averred a claim to quiet title. Petitioner included both the street
11 address, and the Assessor's Parcel Number for the property. Petitioner has set forth
12 facts concerning the title interests of the subject property. Moreover, as shown
13 above, Petitioner's claims for rescission and fraud are meritorious. As such,
14 Petitioner's bases for quiet title are meritorious as well.

15 Defendants have no title, estate, lien, or interest in the Subject Property in that the
16 purported power of sale contained in the Deed of Trust is of no force or effect
17 because Defendants' security interest in the Subject Property has been rendered
18 void and that the Defendants are not the holder in due course of the Promissory
19 Note. Moreover, because Petitioner properly pled all Defendants' involvement in a
20 fraudulent scheme, all Defendants are liable for the acts of its co-conspirators,

21 "a Petitioner is entitled to damages from those Defendants who concur
22 in the tortuous scheme with knowledge of its unlawful purpose."

23 *Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392,*
24 *598 P.2d 45 (1979); Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics, Inc. v. Stop*
25 *Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc., 143 Cal. App. 4th 1284, 50*
26 *Cal. Rptr. 3d 27 (1st Dist. 2006); Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp.,*
27 *40 Cal. App. 4th 1571, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 752 (2d Dist. 1995).*

1 **SUFFICIENCY OF PLEADING**

2 Petitioner has sufficiently pled that relief can be granted on each and every one of
3 the Complaint's causes of action. A complaint should not be dismissed "unless it
4 appears beyond doubt that the Petitioner can prove no set of facts in support of
5 Petitioner claim which would entitle Petitioner to relief." *Housley v. U.S. (9th Cir.
6 Nev. 1994) 35 F.3d 400, 401.* "All allegations of material fact in the complaint are
7 taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to Petitioner." *Argabright v.
8 United States, 35 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996).*

9 Attendant, the Complaint includes a "short, plain statement, of the basis for relief."
10 Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a). The Complaint contains cognizable legal theories,
11 sufficient facts to support cognizable legal theories, and seeks remedies to which
12 Petitioner is entitled. *Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th
13 Cir. 1988); King v. California, 784 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 1986).* Moreover, the
14 legal conclusions in the Complaint can and should be drawn from the facts alleged,
15 and, in turn, the court should accept them as such. *Clegg v. Cult Awareness
16 Network, 18 F.3d 752 (9th Cir, 1994).* Lastly, Petitioner's complaint contains
17 claims and has a probable validity of proving a "set of facts" in support of their
18 claim entitling them to relief. *Housley v. U.S. (9th Cir. Nev. 1994) 35 F.3d 400,
19 401.* Therefore, relief as requested herein should be granted.

20 **CAUSES OF ACTION**

21 **BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY**

23 Defendants Agent, appraiser, trustee, Lender, et al, and each of them, owed
24 Petitioner a fiduciary duty of care with respect to the mortgage loan transactions
25 and related title activities involving the Trust Property.

26 Defendants breached their duties to Petitioner by, *inter alia*, the conduct described
27 above. Such breaches included, but were not limited to, ensuring their own and
28 Petitioners' compliance with all applicable laws governing the loan transactions in

1 which they were involved, including but not limited to, TILA, HOEPA, **RESPA**
2 and the Regulations X and Z promulgated there under.

3 Defendant's breaches of said duties were a direct and proximate cause of economic
4 and non-economic harm and detriment to Petitioner(s).

5 Petitioner did suffer economic, non-economic harm, and detriment as a result of
6 such conduct, all to be shown according to proof at trial of this matter.

7 ***CAUSE OF ACTION - NEGLIGENCE/NEGLIGENCE PER SE***

9 Defendants owed a general duty of care with respect to Petitioners, particularly
10 concerning their duty to properly perform due diligence as to the loans and related
11 transactional issues described hereinabove.

12 In addition, Defendants owed a duty of care under TILA, HOEPA, **RESPA** and the
13 Regulations X and Z promulgated there under to, among other things, provide
14 proper disclosures concerning the terms and conditions of the loans they marketed,
15 to refrain from marketing loans they knew or should have known that borrowers
16 could not afford or maintain, and to avoid paying undue compensation such as
17 "yield spread premiums" to mortgage Agents and loan officers.

18 Defendants knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the
19 loan transactions involving Petitioner and other persons similarly situated were
20 defective, unlawful, violative of federal and state laws and regulations, and would
21 subject Petitioner to economic and non-economic harm and other detriment.

23 Petitioner is among the class of persons that TILA, HOEPA, **RESPA** and the
24 Regulations X and Z promulgated there under were intended and designed to
25 protect, and the conduct alleged against Defendants is the type of conduct and
26 harm which the referenced statutes and regulations were designed to deter.

1 As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence, Petitioner suffered
2 economic and non-economic harm in an amount to be shown according to proof at
3 trial.

4 ***AGENT: COMMON LAW FRAUD***

5 If any Agents' misrepresentations made herein were not intentional, said
6 misrepresentations were negligent. When the Agents made the representations
7 alleged herein, he/she/it had no reasonable ground for believing them to be true.
8

9 Agents made these representations with the intention of inducing Petitioner to act
10 in reliance on these representations in the manner hereafter alleged, or with the
11 expectation that Petitioner would so act.

12 Petitioner is informed and believes that Agent et al, facilitated, aided and abetted
13 various Agents in their negligent misrepresentation, and that various Agents were
14 negligent in not implementing procedures such as underwriting standards oversight
15 that would have prevented various Agents from facilitating the irresponsible and
16 wrongful misrepresentations of various Agents to Defendants.

17 Petitioner is informed and believes that Agent acted in concert and collusion with
18 others named herein in promulgating false representations to cause Petitioner to
19 enter into the LOAN without knowledge or understanding of the terms thereof.
20

21 As a proximate result of the negligent misrepresentations of Agents as herein
22 alleged, the Petitioner sustained damages, including monetary loss, emotional
23 distress, loss of credit, loss of opportunities, attorney fees and costs, and other
24 damages to be determined at trial. As a proximate result of Agents' breach of duty
25 and all other actions as alleged herein, Defendants has suffered severe emotional
26 distress, mental anguish, harm, humiliation, embarrassment, and mental and
27 physical pain and anguish, all to Petitioner's damage in an amount to be
28 established at trial.

1 **PETITIONER PROPERLY AVERRED A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE**
2 **IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.**

3 Petitioner properly pled Defendants violated the breach of implied covenant of
4 good faith and fair dealing. "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of
5 good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." *Price v. Wells*
6 *Fargo Bank*, 213 Cal.App.3d 465, 478, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1989); Rest.2d
7 Contracts § 205. A mortgage Agent has fiduciary duties. *Wyatt v. Union Mortgage*
8 *Co.*, (1979) 24 Cal. 3d. 773. Further, In *Jonathan Neil & Associates, Inc. v Jones*,
9 (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 917, the court stated:

10 In the area of insurance contracts the covenant of good faith and fair dealing has
11 taken on a particular significance, in part because of the special relationship
12 between the insurer and the insured. The insurer, when determining whether to
13 settle a claim, must give at least as much consideration to the welfare of its insured
14 as it gives to its own interests. . . The standard is premised on the insurer's
15 obligation to protect the insured's interests . . . *Id. at 937.*

16 Likewise, there is a special relationship between an Agent and borrower. "A person
17 who provides Agency services to a borrower in a covered loan transaction by
18 soliciting Lenders or otherwise negotiating a consumer loan secured by real
19 property, is the fiduciary of the consumer...this fiduciary duty [is owed] to the
20 consumer regardless of whom else the Agent may be acting as an Agent for . . .

21 The fiduciary duty of the Agent is to deal with the consumer in *good faith*. If the
22 *Agent knew or should have known that the Borrower will or has a likelihood of*
23 *defaulting ... they have a fiduciary duty to the borrower not to place them in that*
24 *loan.*" (California Department of Real Estate, *Section 8: Fiduciary Responsibility*,
25 www.dre.ca.gov). [*Emphasis Added*].

26 All Defendants, willfully breached their implied covenant of good faith and fair
27 dealing with Petitioner when Defendants: (1) Failed to provide all of the proper

1 disclosures; (2) Failed to provide accurate Right to Cancel Notices; (3) Placed
2 Petitioner into Petitioner's current loan product without regard for other more
3 affordable products; (4) Placed Petitioner into a loan without following proper
4 underwriting standards; (5) Failed to disclose to Petitioner that Petitioner was
5 going to default because of the loan being unaffordable; (6) Failed to perform valid
6 and /or properly documented substitutions and assignments so that Petitioner could
7 ascertain Petitioner rights and duties; and (7) Failed to respond in good faith to
8 Petitioner's request for documentation of the servicing of Petitioner's loan and the
9 existence and content of relevant documents. Additionally, Defendants breached
10 their implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with Petitioner when
11 Defendants initiated foreclosure proceedings even without the right under an
12 alleged power of sale because the purported assignment was not recorded and by
13 willfully and knowingly financially profiting from their malfeasance. Therefore,
14 due to the special relationship inherent in a real estate transaction between Agent
15 and borrower, *and* all Defendants' participation in the conspiracy, the Motion to
16 Dismiss should be denied.

17 ***CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF TRUTH IN LENDING ACT 15***
18 ***U.S.C. §1601 ET SEQ***

19 Petitioner hereby incorporates by reference, re-pleads and re-alleges each and
20 every allegation contained in all of the paragraphs of the General Allegations and
21 Facts Common to All Causes of Action as though the same were set forth herein.

22 Petitioner is informed and believes that Defendant's violation of the provisions of
23 law rendered the credit transaction null and void, invalidates Defendant's claimed
24 interest in the Subject Property, and entitles Petitioner to damages as proven at
25 trial.
26

27
28

1 **INTENTIONAL INFILCTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS**

2 The conduct committed by Defendants, driven as it was by profit at the expense of
3 increasingly highly leveraged and vulnerable consumers who placed their faith and
4 trust in the superior knowledge and position of Defendants, was extreme and
5 outrageous and not to be tolerated by civilized society.

6 Defendants either knew that their conduct would cause Petitioner to suffer severe
7 emotional distress, or acted in conscious and/or reckless disregard of the
8 probability that such distress would occur.

9 Petitioner did in fact suffer severe emotional distress as an actual and proximate
10 result of the conduct of Defendants as described hereinabove.

12 As a result of such severe emotional distress, Petitioner suffered economic and non
13 economic harm and detriment, all to be shown according to proof at trial of this
14 matter.

15 Petitioner demands that Defendants provide Petitioner with release of lien on the
16 lien signed by Petitioner and secure to Petitioner quite title;

17 Petitioner demands Defendants disgorge themselves of all enrichment received
18 from Petitioner as payments to Defendants based on the fraudulently secured
19 promissory note in an amount to be calculated by Defendants and verified to
20 Petitioner;

21 Petitioner further demands that Defendants pay to Petitioner an amount equal to
22 treble the amount Defendants intended to defraud Petitioner of which amount
23 Petitioner calculated to be equal to \$1,215,921.72

24 **PRAYER**

25 WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for judgment against the named Defendants, and
26 each of them, as follows:
27

1 For an emergency restraining order enjoining lender and any successor in
2 interest from foreclosing on Petitioner's Property pending adjudication of
3 Petitioner's claims set forth herein;

4 For a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from engaging in the
5 fraudulent, deceptive, predatory and negligent acts and practices alleged
6 herein;

7 For quiet title to Property;

8 For rescission of the loan contract and restitution by Defendants to Petitioner
9 according to proof at trial;

10 For disgorgement of all amounts wrongfully acquired by Defendants
11 according to proof at trial;

12 For actual monetary damages in the amount \$405,307.24;

13 For pain and suffering due to extreme mental anguish in an amount to be
14 determined at trial.

15 For pre-judgment and post-judgment interest according to proof at trial;

16 For punitive damages according to proof at trial in an amount equal to
17 \$1,215,921.72.

18 For attorney's fees and costs as provided by statute; and,

19 For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

20 **Respectfully Submitted,**

21 
22 **Shelley von Brincken**